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EU BANKING UNION 
Introductory thoughts on the current situation 
The decision adopted by the 28 European Union (EU) Member States in June 2012 
on the establishment of the banking union expresses clear political support to the idea 
of common Europe. Is such a pretentious EU project an important historic step 
towards further integration, particularly in terms of the financial sector? Will the 
banking union reconsolidate the connections within the economic and monetary union 
and create better conditions for economic growth? After three decades of deregulation 
of monetary policy, which has taken the European financial situation to the verge of 
a precipice, it is above all important to take precautions to avoid in the future any 
destructive developments similar to those that occurred in the years after 2008.1  
From the very beginning, one democratic principle has to be clear: until the political 
union has not been fully developed, the parliaments of the Member States within the 
Community should have the right to adopt final decisions concerning payments to be 
made directly from the budgets of the Member States to partner countries in trouble. 
The no-bail-out principle established in Article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU2) 
according to which neither single Member States nor the Community as a whole shall 
be responsible for or take over commitments of other Member States, has fundamental 
significance without general high-level political responsibility. It is not possible to 
explain to citizens in an understandable manner why their country and thus under 
certain circumstances also they themselves as taxpayers should bear the financial risks 
caused by either foreign, international or domestic banks with their irresponsible 
transactions which are primarily profit-oriented. This particularly applies to old debts 
taken in the past when only domestic bodies were responsible for the supervision. 
Risk-taking and liability, also financial liability are inseparable in the conditions of 
the free social system. Banks should not be allowed to consider themselves as 
absolutely essential for the functioning of the system and to expect therefore the state 
and eventually the taxpayer to help them. As we saw, this would induce them to take 
higher risks (moral hazard – change in risk perception if it is known beforehand that 
someone else will bear the possible losses), and the crisis sensitivity of the whole 
system would increase.  
The banking union which will have to increase the security of the European financial 
system, achieve clear success in the application of the responsibility principle and thus 





                                                 
1 Particularly in Ireland, Spain and Cyprus. After the national banking supervision agencies had 
failed to perform their duties, these three countries had to request EU support for rescuing their 
banks. 
2 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
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→ joint strict supervision over the financial sector; 
→ comprehensive measures both for the liquidation of bankrupt banks and 
restructuring of the still viable banks;  
→ sufficient and individually sized equity reserves for each bank; and   
→ clear rules of liability. 
The issue is whether the decision adopted by three parties – the European Parliament, 
Council of Ministers of Finance and the European Commission – i.e., the tripartite 
decision on the creation of the banking union conforms to the above-mentioned 
requirements.  
The euro zone banking union is based on the three main columns:  
1) Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Globalisation of financial markets 
requires supranationally organised banking supervision. Proceeding from 
that idea, the European Central Bank (ECP) will receive an additional task 
on 4 November 2014 to analyse regularly the balance sheets of the major 
banks of the euro zone countries (Asset Quality Review, AQR). The 
objective is to discover any latent risks, above all hidden losses, in the 
balance sheets, and if gaps in capitalization are detected, the banks should 
be induced to cover them by adding new equity. Such balance sheet audits 
are supplemented by stress tests, and results of both regulatory inspections 
will be joined up. These audits will include also assessment of credit 
guarantees and practical measures applied for the prevention of risks. It will 
be performed on the basis of the EU definition of non-performing loans and 
also according to the fixed criteria of the risk analysis of main accounting 
records. It is absolutely important in this respect – we learnt it during the 
financial crisis – that updated information and reports should be promptly 
available. Investments in information technology would considerably save 
time. The banking supervision mechanism would help to restore the lost 
confidence in the European banking system. 
2) The European Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) that will be created for 
the 18 eurozone countries will become the core of the banking union. It will 
be based on common rules for the controlled liquidation of banks with 
unsustainable business conceptions and restructuring of banks which have 
encountered difficulties. The mechanism will consist of two components. 
One of them is the crisis management agency which will establish the 
further procedure on the initiative of the European Central Bank 3  and 
monitor the subsequent process. It is important for the crisis management 
agency and the European Central Bank to have close cooperation as 
supervision and crisis management should be in the same hands. According 
to political discussions, however, the opinions are very different in this 
respect. The second component of the mechanism is the crisis management 
                                                 
3 The European Commission can review the result of the crisis management agency and make 
objections in case of doubts, which will be then settled by the Council of Ministers.  
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fund. The fund should ensure that the banks will bear the mutual financial 
burden and prevent the eventual responsibility of the taxpayer again. By the 
end of the creation stage the total amount of the fund planned will be 55 
billion euros. 
3) The third column will consist in internal liability in the form of a cascading 
liability. Allocations from the crisis management fund (restructuring fund) 
can be used for recapitalization only after shareholders and creditors have 
assumed their part of liability arising from the basic principle of market 
economy (bail-in). 
In principle, banks should first of all back their debt obligations prudently 
with sufficient equity. Sufficient means that the equity should be sufficient 
to enable each bank to fulfil its payment obligations for at least 30 days in a 
crisis situation without involving external funds. In order to achieve that, 
the equity base should be measured according to the risks related to each 
obligation and taking into account all balance sheet and off-balance sheet 
commitments (leverage ratio). Considering the amount of total assets, the 
currently mandatory three per cent is clearly too low; it should be at least 
eight per cent. – Thus, the liability of shareholders is backed first of all by 
the retained earnings which they financially own but which will not be 
distributed to them. In addition, shareholders will have to bear with their 
shareholder rights the costs of restructuring or controlled liquidation of the 
bankrupt banks. Both of these components are a ’strong core capital’. 
Creditors of the bank are at the next stage of liability, namely first of all 
junior creditors with subordinated loans, followed by senior creditors with 
primary rights. And finally the distribution of the financial burden reaches 
also depositors as holders of claims against the bank. With respect to their 
deposits, EU Member States agreed for the purposes of distribution policy 
to establish regulations which are analogous with the German Deposit 
Guarantee and Investor Compensation Act. According to this Act, deposits 
of up to 100,000 euros will not be subject to the liability requirements.4  
 The future will show whether the banking union established will meet the 
expectations and is able to restore the confidence of the financial sector. The 
purpose of the supervisory mechanism is to discover weaknesses of the financial 
sector. Therefore banks should be obliged to declare clearly their off-balance sheet 
financial activities. In addition, all risks arising from financing performed through 
security brokers, insurance companies and trusts should be recorded.   
Different bodies will be performing banking supervision in the future. While the 
120 major banks of the eurozone countries, the banks essential for the system, will 
be subjected to the single supervisory mechanism (SSM) of the European Central 
                                                 
4 This specifically means the following: EU Member States took the commitment of establishing 
a national fund for the insurance of bank deposits to secure deposits of up to 100,000 euros per 
bank client.  
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Bank, approximately 5800 banks declared to be of less importance will remain – at 
least at first – under the supervision of national agencies. Such differentiation leads 
to the question – why should the European major banks assume only 85% of the 
costs of the new banking supervision of the European Central Bank and the other 
banks will have to cover the remaining 15%.  
By dividing this extremely important task in the manner described, the fact that 
there are close mutual connections and relations in the banking sector is ignored. 
Also not very big banks perform partly risky transactions at their own risk (trading 
under their own name). Liquid assets are also often invested in presumably secure 
government bonds which are generally considered to be free of problems or at least 
not so risky. However, according to the experience gained from the years of crisis, 
such assessments are arbitrary and do not often take into account the often observed 
interconnection between national debts and banking crises. For instance, if a 
country is threatened by insolvency, the related risk of losses may be transferred to 
the bank depending on the amount of bonds deposited with the bank.     
The banking sector is represented not only by globally operating banks. As 
operators of the financial sector are closely networking, no definite separation line 
can be drawn between banks that are important or less important for the system. 
There are no criteria that could be used for that in practice. The amount of total 
assets over 30 billion euros or 20% of the economic capacity of the country are not 
sufficient bases for that. Therefore all banks without exception should be subjected 
to central control. This would be the only way to achieve effective pan-European 
supervision within the EU. It is important to perform risk assessments, verify the 
quality of loans issued and other assets, and perform also stress tests proceeding 
from common positions (e.g., on the basis of definite crisis scenarios).        
The more regulated are the activities of banks, the more interested will be the actors 
in the financial market in going over to the areas not subject to the strict banking 
supervision mechanism, such as hedge funds, private equity funds, special-purpose 
investment funds (conduits), structured investment vehicles. Consequently, a 
solution should be found to subject such shadow banks to analogous supervision. 
At any rate, banking supervision – as planned within the framework of the banking 
union – is a tremendous task. It can be achieved only with a significant number of 
employees who need to have the required knowledge and skills to be able to assess 
extremely complex derivative instruments (derivatives), their underlying securities 
and residual risks. It is questionable whether the European Central Bank is prepared 
for that, bearing in mind the organisation and the required staff. And therefore the 





 Considering the fact that since the start of the financial crisis the countries have 
had to invest more than 1.5 trillion euros5 to rescue from collapse the banks that are 
important for the system6, the 55 billion euros intended for the liquidation fund is 
quite insufficient. Also the German Monopolies Commission considers the amount 
insufficient, bearing in mind the size of certain banks. The German Commerzbank 
alone needed assistance to the extent of more than 18 billion euros from the state 
during the years of crisis. If the system should fall into crisis again, the financial 
resources of the fund would be exhausted every soon. Also the regulation that in 
each case the fund can allocate financial resources after the bail-in to the extent of 
five per cent as a maximum of the total assets of the bank does not change anything. 
It would hardly be possible to strengthen the financial system of the eurozone with 
the assistance of a fund of such modest size and to protect the taxpayer as the last 
instance for unjustified burdens.7 
In order to keep the contributions for setting up the liquidation fund within 
reasonable limits for banks, the possibility for extending the creation phase to ten 
years from 2015 was discussed at first. Finally the duration of the phase of 8 years 
was agreed upon. This is still not a long period, considering that the funds 
contributed during the period will become common assets only gradually. It is not 
certain at all that no new banking crises will emerge during the accumulation phase 
and whether the funds gathered by that time would be sufficient.   
In order to prevent bearing of the burden by the taxpayer again during such 
accumulation phase, it will be made possible to use the resources of the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) in an emergency if the respective eurozone country 
files an application for direct recapitalization of banks. Thus ESM will remain the 
safety net ('backstop') for less capable Member States as it is now. However, it can 
only be used if specific requirements have been met.8  
 
                                                 
5 These are financial resources which public budgets lack to reconstruct infrastructure, develop 
the educational system, support scientific research and innovation.  
6 The total assets of which exceed the gross domestic product of some average EU Member State. 
– The order of magnitude of only Deutsche Bank is comparable to ca 60% of the economic 
performance of whole Germany. 
7 Although in such a problematic situation ESM may apply for additional support for direct 
recapitalisation of the bank to a limited extent after the national government has already allocated 
its financial support. 
8 Firstly, according to the principle of internal responsibility, the losses of banks with problems 
should be borne by shareholders and creditors of banks (bail-in). In addition, for the use of 
ESM, national bank deposit protection funds (restructuring funds) have to be exhausted first. 
Banks have no direct access to ESM. The funds can only be used on the basis of an application 
of the national government and only if the state is not able to fill the remaining financial gaps 
from the national budget (national backstop is meant here). At any rate, it would increase the 
national debt of the applying country and the intention was to prevent that, considering the 




 The discussions also include the issue of the bases of determination of the 
amount of the contributions of each bank to the European restructuring fund. In 
principle, contributions to the restructuring fund should consist of two components: 
firstly, the basic amount calculated on the basis of total assets, independently of 
risks, therefore proceeding from the bank size (a certain percentage of total 
liabilities); secondly, an amount derived from the risk profile of the bank, so that 
large banks with higher risk exposure would tend to pay more. Such a combination 
would allow little variation in the size of payments over time. This in its turn would 
favour more consistent development of the fund.     
Should exceptions, reduction of the amount used for the calculation of the payment, 
and other limits or thresholds be allowed in the determination of the size of 
payments – particularly, considering the risk prevention provisions of the Basel III 
Agreement, for instance, if it is required by the bank size or importance of the fields 
of activities; but this issue should still be discussed with the participation of all 
countries. It is necessary to consider that above all medium-sized enterprises rely 
on high performance smaller and medium-sized banks for the financing of their 
credit-based investments, often only on the regional banks.  
According to tax law, contributions of banks to the fund should be regulated in 
similar manner in all countries. This is important for the prevention of distortions 
of competition in the European banking sector. It should also not be possible to 
deduct such payments from taxable income as it would reduce the tax revenues of 
countries. It would sooner or later increase the tax burden of taxpayers again if it 
becomes necessary to adjust the state budget revenues to the development of 
expenditures. Consequently, taxpayers would be indirectly involved in the 
financing of the fund anyway.      
 Internal liability has been limited to 8% of the total assets of the insolvent bank. 
According to the responsibility principle of market economy, such a limitation is 
quite incomprehensible. Outside the banking community, shareholders and 
creditors take full responsibility for the insolvency of a company. The issue is about 
why internal liability has been limited in the banking sector and why does it have 
to be eight per cent. Thus, most bail-in resources would not be used for covering 
the debts.  
 It should certainly be absolutely clear at the very beginning that without the 
liability of owners and creditors, preventive recapitalisation by the state, i.e. 
preventive state aid is excluded. The same should apply also to emergency 
situations when a risk of systemic crisis in the financial market emerges. Otherwise, 
the principle of internal liability is eliminated and an opportunity is created for 
avoiding the rules. 
The banking union is a step in the right direction. The three columns described have, 
however, also some weaknesses. This applies particularly to the size of the liquidation 
fund that will be created. It is simply ridiculously small considering the experience of 
the years of crises. Different competencies of the European Central Bank and bodies 
of the Member States in banking supervision raise doubts of whether such a 
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fundamental task would be solved according to common criteria. Besides, it is not 
understandable why the internal liability of an insolvent bank is limited to 8% of the 
amount of its total assets9 . Such a limit violates the central principle of market 
economy. This limit facilitates access to the fund and reduces the disciplining effect 
of internal liability. In general it is really questionable whether the banking union will 
fulfil its objectives in the currently planned form.  
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9 The same applies to the possible use of the European Stabilisation Fund (ESM) resources during 
the liquidation fund creation phase of eight years.  
 
